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Abstract: This paper attempts to show that the greatest impediment to a 
reduction in the transaction cost consists of two factors. First, the problem of 
the choice of laws makes contracting a hazardous enterprise for those who have 
an information disadvantage. Second, the reluctance of the legal profession to 
embrace and familiarise themselves with uniform international laws does not 
enhance a client’s expectation to be able to access the ‘best’ law. It is argued 
that the inclusion of international uniform laws such as the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG, 1980) will 
reduce the transactions costs either at trial or when a problem arises as both 
parties operate in essence under the same law and, hence, a negotiated 
settlement is more likely. The paper specifically addresses the problem which 
can emerge when a contract is silent as to which law will govern the legal 
relationship. Close attention is given to a possibility of overcoming choice of 
laws problems by applying the CISG, instead of explicitly excluding the CISG. 
This paper also investigates the inclusions of soft laws into contracts and the 
ability of such an inclusion to reduce transaction costs. The conclusion is that 
the inclusion of uniform laws reduces uncertainty and is, furthermore, merely 
recognition of a development which is gathering speed. 
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1 Introduction 
In 1988 Ernst Zitelmann advanced the notion that domestic laws in all the legal systems 
in the world should be replaced by one uniform ‘global law’.1 While such an endeavour 
has a logical foundation, it is nevertheless an overly optimistic idea. The search for a 
uniform global law could be compared to the famous entry in ancient maps of Africa 
namely. The term ‘Hic sunt leones, here are the lions’ referred to the country south of the  
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Sahara and is an expression of the lack of understanding of the Europeans what lay 
behind the great expanse of sand.2 The same can be said in relation to a search for a 
global law. 
It is common knowledge that such endeavours did not eventuate despite many efforts. 
In order to create a ‘global law’ – akin to crossing the Sahara – the problem of sovereign 
legal systems needs to be overcome. It can be safely assumed that the creation of a 
supranational global law with its own supranational system of courts is and remains a 
dream for many years to come. At this stage it cannot be envisaged that nations would 
give up their legal sovereignty and have their individual citizen subjected to a ‘global 
Law and court system’. As an example the attempts of nations to create a global system 
via the WTO treaties is stumbling and whether a successful conclusion of a unified world 
trade system inclusive of agriculture can be created is doubtful. Also trading blocks such 
as the EU still maintain ‘domestic’ systems despite ongoing endeavours to form a unified 
EU legal system. 
History and practical experience has shown that the only solution is to create a 
‘half way house’. The aim is to draft conventions which in turn are to be included 
in every legal system and for the courts of every legal system to apply the uniform 
laws. Ernst Rabel in 1930 built on the idea of a global law but on a much more modest 
level – looking at one area of law only – by proposing a unified sales law and published a 
legal text to that end. Many attempts have been made to unify global laws in discrete 
areas. Some succeeded whereas others failed. It is simply impossible to take a holistic 
approach to unification and a more differentiated treatment must be sought.3 This is 
so as ‘legal transactions’ inevitable will touch on many aspects of law and must be dealt 
with discretely. 
As a result domestic law has changed dramatically over the past 30 years. The 
landscape has been remodelled as a result of globalisation through transplantations and 
the introduction of uniform international laws. These laws were either spawned by 
agencies of the United Nations such as UNCITRAL or by independent bodies such as 
UNIDROIT in Rome. Furthermore the efforts of trade blocks in their attempts to create a 
unified system of law cannot be underestimated. This work however is also progressing 
very slowly as each aspect of law such a corporate law or consumer laws – just to 
mention a few – must be investigated in turn. The result of these efforts is that domestic 
law has been ‘enriched’ by a body of law which was not designed and drafted by 
their own municipal parliaments but by academics and practitioners which in a sense 
reduces the political compromise situation which inevitably leads to a result which is not 
the best outcome.  
Despite the success of some instruments several barriers need to be overcome in order 
to implement laws drafted by international bodies. It is one thing for a country to sign a 
convention but it is another step for a country to actually include the law into its domestic 
system. Ratification depends entirely on the perception by a particular state if there is a 
need to do so and have the uniform law applied within that jurisdiction. Arguably this 
will happen if the state has an incentive to do so or assumes that there are economic 
benefits Even if the convention is included into the domestic regime success is still 
not guaranteed.  
The effect of a unified law is measured by its uptake within particular systems. The 
economic benefit and hence the uptake will not depend on the governments evaluation 
but on the parties who will incorporate the law into their legal framework. 
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To that end the legal community needs to have understood the system and is willing 
to prescribe to the uniform legal rules. Unfortunately the result is that many legal 
professionals still have their feet firmly planted in an ever diminishing domestic paddock. 
This becomes apparent when the application and interpretation of uniform laws is the 
focal point. Judging by the application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in Australia, many court and legal professionals 
have not yet understood or did not endeavour to understand the significant differences 
between the interpretation and application of international instruments.4 It can be said 
that too few of the decided cases reflect a proper application of the CISG and in some 
cases it was astonishing that they were ever brought to trial as the matter was lost before 
the trial even begun.5 This is a discomforting level of ignorance in relation to 
international instruments. It is also interesting to note that the Australian Government 
ratified the CISG but then turned around and allowed government departments to 
specifically exclude the CISG from their contracts. It is arguably not a good example for 
the economic community to change their inward looking tendencies and embrace uniform 
international rules in favour of domestic ones. Australia is not the only country where 
such a lack of understanding can be discovered. In the US Professor Fitzgerald has 
conducted an empirical study of the knowledge of the legal practitioners’ understanding 
of “International Contracting Practices” and found the same lack of knowledge as it is 
anecdotally known in Australia.6 
To simply remain within one’s own legal system may at first glance be a perfectly 
good solution. It guarantees that the legal system is understood or at least ought to be 
understood by the plaintiff. However this argument ignores the fact that another system 
namely an international one would be better suited and supply a better outcome. 
Fitzgerald has noted in his survey what has been suspected by academics that: 
“In essence a significant number of lawyers are defaulting to the wrong 
law, in the absence of an effective choice of law clause, when trying 
to determine the rights and responsibilities arising out of international 
commercial transactions.”7 
Furthermore only the dominant contractual party can insist on relying on their own terms 
and conditions and many businesses are not always in that favoured position and hence 
have to submit to a foreign legal system. If an understanding of uniform laws is part of 
the stock of knowledge of lawyers errors in selections of choice of law clauses can be 
minimised. If both parties work from the same legal facts – that is a uniform law – it can 
be argued that potentially conflicts can be minimised and transaction costs reduced. This 
is so because both parties possess the same knowledge and hopefully litigation based on 
erroneous information about the foreign law can be avoided. 
This paper will explore the advantages of carefully analysing the choice of law 
clauses as otherwise unexpected results can eventuate. The uniform law instrument which 
will be analysed is the CISG which has now been ratified by 70 nations. The number of 
states is arguably significant enough to suggest that the CISG is a successful convention 
hence warranting a careful analysis within the scope of this paper.  
2 Problem of choice of laws – a general discussion 
It is a truism to argue that there is only a problem in relation to choice of laws,8 because 
there is no ‘global law’. If there would be a uniform global law the conflict of law rules 
would have become redundant as all domestic laws are the same.9 As the second 
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alternative, choice of law rules could have been unified. This rule only takes on substance 
within each legal system and hence can vary between countries. As an example the 
Brazilian Civil Code points to the law of the country where the obligation came into 
being whereas in the USA the conflict of law rules vary depending on the subject matter 
of the obligation. A question of validity is governed by the same approach as the 
Brazilian Civil Code whereas the question of performance is governed by the law of the 
place of performance.10 
The EU follows the Rome Convention Article 4 which points to the law with which a 
contract has its closest and real connection. It is obvious that depending where 
jurisdiction is sought different results as to the governing law will be obtained.  
Basedow illustrates this divergence with a simple example.11 German buyer and 
American seller sign a contract at Zurich airport. The sale involves delivery of goods to 
Brazil on CIF terms. 
“A Brazilian court would apply Swiss law, while both the German and 
American court would apply the CISG in the first place and issues not 
governed by that Convention would be subject to German law as the law of the 
seller in a German court and , arguably, to Brazilian law as the law of the place 
of performance by an American Court.”12 
This example clearly illustrates that jurisdictional issues and hence the associated conflict 
of laws rules play an important role in determining the governing law. Unification would 
have taken away the unpredictability with regard to the choice of a substantive rule 
only.13 Attempts were made to conclude a convention regulating private international law 
however so far this has proven to be an elusive goal. 
To draft such a convention has not been helped by the fact that conventions in 
general are not codes; they are not complete statements of law on a particular topic. 
The reason is that policy preferences of states in the drafting process are likely to diverge 
than coincide.14 
However because of the prevalence of uniform laws recourse to national law has been 
reduced but because international contracts cannot stand alone but need a legal 
framework which can only be provided by domestic law, the conflict of laws rules are 
still indispensable.15 
It must be stressed that the objective of the drafting of choice of law clauses should 
not only be the reduction of transaction costs but an attempt to chose the most appropriate 
forum and a governing law which offers the best advantage for a particular contractual 
situation. As an example commodity contracts nearly always chose English law and 
London as the forum in their contractual clauses despite the fact that neither party has any 
connection to England nor are the goods ever passing thought England. This is so as the 
commercial courts in London have developed an expertise over centuries and that 
particular historical familiarity with the law appears still to be valued by commodity 
traders. Some evidence suggests that in many situations the ‘home advantage’ is chosen 
not because of a conscious decision of the drafters but because the drafters do not 
understand the law once a transaction ‘crosses borders’. Inadvertently such a lack of 
knowledge can produce the opposite effect namely the best law is not necessarily chosen 
and hence the costs of litigation can offset the reduction of transaction costs. It must also 
be added that in many instances counsel will draft agreements that pursue their own 
interests as they would risk loosing business “arising from the contract in question to 
foreign lawyers if they recommend the reference to foreign law as the law governing 
the contract”.16 
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3 The CISG and the choice of laws – a practical discussion 
At the onset it must be stated that the discussion below is only relevant in situations 
where parties are not contract takers as in such situations terms are entered into on a take 
it or leave it basis. To be precise if a buyer is the dominant party the seller has not much 
option except to decline the business which is rarely the case. If on the other hand the 
seller is the dominant party a choice is still possible as in many cases the seller is not the 
only possible source as others can supply the relevant goods at near or the same costs. In 
these cases legal advisors ought to be skilled enough to analyse the choice of law clauses 
and negotiate the best option for their clients.  
In relation to the CISG, the convention has become part of our domestic law and 
governs international contracts. The domestic law, that is the common law and relevant 
statutes, are only of relevance if the CISG has a gap which needs filling. For that reason it 
is still important to include a choice of law clause into any contract. There is however an 
alternate way to overcome the problem of discovering the applicable law by first looking 
at the general principles of the CISG and see whether a choice of law rule is embedded in 
the Convention. In other words the question is whether there is a gap in the CISG which 
would need to be filled by the relevant domestic law. If there is no gap and the CISG 
covers this issue then the matter could be resolved by taking recourse to the CISG.  
If there is no gap the next question would be whether such a rule would displace the 
otherwise applicable domestic law. First the question would need to be answered whether 
a substantive rule ‘trumps’ a procedural rule of the forum. It is argued that substantive 
rules will in general take precedent over a procedural rule in case of a conflict. Secondly 
there is nothing to suggest that private international laws are mandatory in nature hence 
the CISG arguably could displace an otherwise applicable domestic private international 
law rule.17 This view finds support by the fact that: 
“… the essential quality of [a] uniform substantive law is its applicability 
to those cases specified by the restrictions it sets on its own sphere 
of application.”18 
Hence if Articles 31 and 57(1) are considered to be restrictions in relation to conflict of 
laws, they would displace the domestic private international law rules.19 Such an 
approach would provide certainty in the application of the governing law as the domestic 
variations in the application of the choice of law rules would be overcome. It is indeed 
true to argue that private international law “amounts to an engine of international discord 
detracting from the unity of the CISG that courts and arbitrators should only use as 
a last resort”.20 
It can be argued that a choice of law rule is indeed embedded in the CISG if 
Article 1(a) applies that is both parties have their place of business in a Contracting State. 
This means that the CISG will apply as the governing law. It is agreed that in 
most circumstances the court where jurisdiction has been seized will apply the choice of 
law rule of the forum to determine the governing law. However, as argued above, once 
uniform laws are involved which include a conflict rules the conclusion is that the 
uniform rule – in this case the CISG – should be extended to elicit the choice of law 
rule. The obvious advantage is that certainty and predictability has been introduced and 
most importantly it can be done within a framework of familiarity. It is not unusual for  
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courts to look at the place where payment is due as supplying the relevant substantive 
law.21 In other words courts strive to elicit the place where the contract has its real and 
most substantial connection. 
Returning to the assertion that Articles 31 and 57(1) can be used to extract a general 
principle which will make a choice of laws irrelevant; it needs to be considered 
specifically in light of the above conclusions. 
Article 31 describes the obligations of the seller whereas Article 57(1) deals with the 
obligations of the buyer. Simply put, Article 31 first upholds a possible contractual duty, 
namely that the seller is obliged to deliver the goods at any agreed particular place. If 
there is no such obligation, his obligation to deliver goods consists ‘in handing the goods 
over to the first carrier for transmission to the buyer’. This obligation corresponds as 
close as possible to an Incoterm FCA contract. The remainder of Article 31, in essence, 
repeats the above as in all other cases the seller is obliged to place the goods’ at the 
buyer’s disposal at the place where the seller had his place of business’. It can be argued 
that in line with judicial precedent, the closest connection is the seller’s place of business.  
As far as the buyer’s obligation is concerned, Article 57(1) demands that the price is 
paid to the seller ‘at the seller’s place of business’. 
In other words, an application of Articles 31 and 57(1) lead to the same conclusion, 
namely that the performance of contractual obligations is due at the seller’s place.22 The 
fact that the law of the seller governs the contract is nothing new and is repeated in many 
international instruments such as the Rome Convention and many domestic systems of 
law also follow this rule.23 The inevitable conclusion is that the CISG does not collide 
with domestic laws on this subject because the CISG has displaced both the substantive 
law and the choice of law rules of the lex causae.24 
It appears to be clear from the discussion above that a potential weakening of a 
contractual position arises when the CISG is explicitly excluded. The problem now is that 
a contractual party has given up the only common factor in a relationship mainly the 
CISG in favour of a potentially unknown foreign law. Even if foreign law is explicitly 
chosen at least the CISG should be retained as the common feature to both parties.  
Such exclusion is arguably not helping clients who have submitted to a foreign law 
even if it is a neutral law. An example will illustrate this point namely the absence of a 
perfect tender rule in the CISG. This example is very pertinent for US parties as they 
would rely on UCC Article 2. The buyer can reject the delivery if he ‘fails in any respect’ 
to conform to the contract which in effect can defeat or postpone contract formation.25 
This will inevitably lead to interrelated problems affecting customs duties, letter of 
credits, third party obligations, etc.26 The CISG takes a far more pragmatic attitude which 
is in tune with international trade realities. There are only two possible solutions available 
to the aggrieved party in cases of defects of goods. If the damage is minor the buyer has 
to pay for the goods and accept the goods hence conclude the contractual obligations. 
Damages or any other relevant compensation can then be claimed. If on the other hand 
the breach is fundamental the contract can be avoided. The CISG simply tries to keep the 
contract afoot as long as possible which avoids having to deal with interrelated problems 
if a contract can be avoided for even a minor discrepancy. It can be safely argued that 
transaction costs are potentially increased when choosing the UCC Article 2 instead of 
the default rule supplied by the CISG. 
Furthermore it has to be recognised that on occasions parties cannot agree on the 
selection of a governing law as both reject the application of the others’ domestic law. 
The solution obviously is that the parties need to agree on the application of a third 
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unrelated system of law. The first point which needs to be made is that parties often 
confuse the need for a law which represents both contractual positions and the domestic 
law of a politically neutral state.27 A common contractual position would necessitate that 
the parties choose a law which reflects both parties’ underlying legal system. As an 
example a Canadian seller and an Australian buyer could conceivably chose the law of 
England as representing as close as possible their own contractual positions. However on 
many occasions a third law is chosen namely what is perceived to be a ‘neutral’ law. 
Switzerland and the UK profit greatly from these decisions. Two points need to be made. 
First, choosing the law of Switzerland or England both parties would be governed by a 
law which is ‘foreign’ to each contractual party. Secondly in most cases the choice of a 
‘neutral law’ is in reality confusion between choice of law and jurisdiction. Switzerland 
presents a stable political structure; it is known to be efficient and effective in the 
protection and enforcement of awards. In other words Switzerland is viewed as having an 
efficient jurisdiction. However despite having an efficient jurisdiction the underlying law 
may not be as suitable as another jurisdiction in resolving potential contractual issues. 
An example will highlight the problem of submitting to a foreign law in this case a 
‘neutral law’. If the law of Switzerland is chosen then at the same time the law of Turkey 
is chosen as Turkey transplanted the Swiss Civil Code into their legal regime. As a matter 
of fact the two systems of law are so close that it may be said that they are the same.28 
Swiss law in itself (and any other law for that matter) contains differences which may be 
hard to understand. As an example non delivery and defective delivery are discussed 
briefly. It would be permissible to believe that non-delivery applies in situations where 
goods have not been delivered. Defective delivery applies when the delivered goods for 
one reason or another do not conform to the contract. The reality is not so simple.  
Under the Swiss Law of Obligation, non-delivery stands for the failure of a seller to 
deliver goods exactly as provided by the contract. If for example a Fork lift truck with 
automatic transmission is ordered but one with manual transmission is delivered this 
constitutes non-delivery. Defective delivery would only apply if the automatic 
transmission fork lift as ordered and delivered proves to be faulty. The distinction is 
easy to work out if specific goods are the subject of the contract. However once 
non-ascertainable goods are ordered the distinction becomes rather difficult to predict. If, 
for example, Merlot wine would be ordered from region X but Merlot wine from region Z 
is delivered does this constitute non-delivery or defective delivery? The answer is it 
amounts to a non-delivery. However the delivery of empty oil barrels instead of empty 
petroleum barrels has been held to be a defective delivery.29 
The distinction is important as in cases of non-delivery, the remedies available to the 
aggrieved party go beyond those available under the sales law namely Article 197 et seq. 
In cases of non-delivery, the aggrieved party may be granting a Nachfrist, rescind the 
contract or insist on specific performance and can do so within a ten-year period.  
In cases of defective delivery the buyer can merely rescind the contract or claim a 
reduction of the price and furthermore strict time limits apply. However, if the aggrieved 
party wishes to claim damages the criterion of ‘immediacy of causation’ pursuant to 
Article 208 (2) & (3) of the Swiss law of Obligation has also to be satisfied. (Another 
principle with is not known in common law) The CISG and many other legal systems do 
not make the above distinctions. 
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A further potential problem in applying the CISG – or any other international 
instrument for that mater – is the fact that these instruments require a different mode of 
interpretation. The result is that the interpretation of contracts differs from domestic 
practices. Most international instruments have an interpretative article embedded in the 
regulatory regime.  
As pointed out above many international instruments contain an interpretative article 
such as Article 7 in the CISG. In short this article mandates that an international view is 
to be taken and domestic precedent cannot be used and hence recourse to international 
decisions is essential. 
A further point is that the CISG also mandates the interpretation of contractual 
documents via Article 8. This article takes the subjective as well as the objective intent of 
parties into consideration. To put the matter into domestic phraseology the contextual 
approach is to be applied and not the textual one. In other words the parol evidence rule 
cannot be applied. The advantages of such an interpretation of contractual intend is 
obvious. The CISG does not separate the contractual instrument from the negotiations; 
the intent of the parties in other words – what they mutually expected the contractual 
obligation to be – is the paramount determinate aspect.  
It is encouraging to note that the High Court understands that uniformity of law is an 
important feature which contributes towards certainty and predictability in international 
trade. The homeward trend – that is the only focus on one’s own domestic system – has 
not been abolished but certainly weakened by the High Court of Australia. This does not 
mean that the High Court has abolished the parol evidence rule but decisions are taken 
with the view to reflect international customs that is a view towards uniformity of 
decisions in certain discreet areas of law – domestic or international – has been achieved. 
Generally speaking the High Court has indicated that foreign judgements must be 
taken into consideration even if a domestic law tracks an international convention such as 
the Warsaw Convention. In a domestic matter the High Court noted: 
“decision must be reached by this court with close attention to any relevant 
developments of international law, including decisions of the municipal courts 
of other states parties.”30 
The Australian High Court went on to state that “no differentiation could be drawn on the 
basis that it was not obligatory for Australia to apply the language of the Warsaw 
Convention to domestic carriage by air within Australia”.31 
The mere fact that the Warsaw convention was transplanted into Australian domestic 
law was sufficient for the High Court to abandon ethnocentric interpretation in favour of 
an international one. Arguably a reason not to adopt an international interpretation would 
be difficult to maintain and would run contrary to the objective of certainty. 
4 The success of non legal rules 
Not all successful rules are part of a legal system’s body of law. Many organisations such 
as UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT and the ICC have drafted model laws or soft laws which in 
some circumstances have been applied in preference to domestic black letter law. The 
reason is simple; party autonomy created an ‘application ladder’ which asks tribunal and 
courts to interpret the contract as it stands. The black letter law merely is a fall back 
position which fills gaps left open by a contractual document. The only exceptions to 
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party autonomy are mandatory laws which cannot be excluded. Hence documents such as 
the UCP 60032 and Incoterms are widely applied to the exclusion of domestic laws. 
Because there is a wide body of law and academic writing, the rules are predictable and 
the results foreseeable.33 
As far as the UNIDROIT principles are concerned courts are starting – at least 
in a questioning way – address the advantages the Principles can offer when 
interpreting contracts. Courts in many jurisdictions have referred to the Principles on 
several occasions.  
Three decisions are of interest namely two English and a New Zealand one. It is 
specifically instructive to note the views expressed in Hideo Yoshimoto v Canterbury 
Golf International Ltd. The New Zealand Court of Appeal found it necessary to refer to 
the UNIDROIT Principles and the CISG as they grappled with difficulties in interpreting 
a contract. Specifically the advantages of Article 4.3 of the Principles were explained as 
allowing the court a more realistic approach in the interpretation of contracts. However 
the court did not apply the Principles or the CISG for that matter, as they were not 
prepared to go beyond these declarations. The court commented: 
“But while this Court could seek to depart from the law as applied in 
England and bring the law in New Zealand into line with these 
international conventions, I do not think it would be permitted to do so by the 
Privy Council.” 
At the time of this decision the Privy Council was still the highest appellate court in 
New Zealand. Arguably therefore there is sufficient evidence that domestic systems have 
engaged in considering the Principles in the process of ‘creeping’ transplantation. Bonell 
points out that the Principles are useful as a means of interpreting and supplementing the 
otherwise applicable law in cross border transactions. The argument Bonell advances is 
that even if the CISG is applicable the UNIDROIT principles can be used as a guide to 
clarify otherwise unclear matters where the CISG is either silent or not explicit. 
Furthermore nothing would prevent a domestic seller or buyer to include the UNIDROIT 
Principles as clauses into the contract. The interesting part would be that the contract 
cannot be interpreted using the parol evidence rule as the contract via the UNIDROIT 
principles contains a valid interpretative rule which must be used. This is so as the parol 
evidence rule is not a mandatory domestic law hence the contract takes precedence over 
the fall back position namely the common law or any other statutes.  
The UNIDROIT Principles and the CISG have also found their way into English case 
law despite the fact that the UK has so far refused to ratify the CISG despite being very 
proactive in the drafting process.  
In ProForce Recruit Ltd v Rugby Group Ltd34 – a domestic case – Mummery 
LJ noted: 
“careful consideration may have to be given to the aims to be achieved by 
contractual interpretation and the precise extent to which the law requires an 
objective interpretation, It may be appropriate to consider a number of 
international instruments applying to contracts. It is sufficient to take two 
examples. The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
give primacy to the common intention of the parties and on questions of 
interpretation requires regard to be had to all the circumstances, including  
the pre-contractual negotiations of the parties (art 4.3). The UN Convention  
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) provides that a  
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party's intention is in certain circumstances relevant, and in determining  
that intention regard is to be had to all relevant circumstances, including 
preliminary negotiations.” 
Similar sentiments were expressed in another English domestic case by Lady Ardon in 
The Square Mile Partnership Ltd v Fitzmaurice McCall Ltd.35 It certainly can be argued 
that the English courts are increasingly becoming aware of the need to ‘modernise’ 
contractual interpretation in order to stay in step with international developments. 
It can be added in passing that many legal practitioners are familiar with arbitration 
and many institutional arbitration rules specifically allow the arbitrators to use non-black 
letter laws if the parties authorise the tribunal to do so. As an example the ACICA36 rules 
as well as the Swiss Rules of international Arbitration have a similar clause which states:  
“The arbitral tribunal shall decide as amiable compositeur or ex acquo et bono 
only if the parties have expressly authorized the arbitral tribunal to do so.”37 
Simply put the black letter law is always assumed to be applicable unless the parties 
decide otherwise. However the choice is there and if the parties wish to do so they can 
move to a non black letter law which is then applicable as the substantive law of the 
contract and hence avoid the application of a particular domestic law. 
A particular pertinent point needs to be made specifically relevant to common law 
countries. As pointed out above London and English law is often chosen as a preferred 
clause in a contact. As an example commodity sales basically only operate through the 
London courts. A recent development is of importance. The EU currently is making 
progress with the writing and eventual introduction of a uniform European Sales law. 
No doubt such a move will change the English Common Law. On an official political 
level, unification of sales laws has played an important part. A few years ago, the 
European Parliament passed a resolution requesting the European organs to start work on 
a pan-European Contract Law. That was in 1989 and a second time in 1994. Although at 
the beginning the Commission was reluctant, it has now become active. The Commission 
listed the various options available for a further development of Contract Law in the EU 
in its communication of 2001. Based on the opinions which the Commission received, the 
European Commission published an ‘action plan’ for a coherent European Contract Law. 
In this action plan, the Commission provides for the drafting of a so-called “reference 
frame” for Contract Law,38 which should form the basis for further reflection on an 
optional instrument in the area of European contract law. The reference frame is expected 
to be published by the end of 2007. Several ‘think tanks’ have taken up the work, and  
the ‘soft law codification’ in the form of the Principles of European Contract Law 
(1995/1999/2003) shows that the sceptics of a unified, ‘Europeanised’ contract law are 
wrong. Considering the desire of the EU to strengthen and develop unified laws amongst 
its members, the question is, what will happen if Britain ‘properly’ joins the EU fold. If 
the European Commission introduces a ‘common European contract law’, will such an 
event override the common law and replace it with a common European Law? This may 
sound futuristic and improbable but considering that the EU has not only survived but has 
enlarged its influence, the improbable today may become reality tomorrow. 
The conclusion simply is that unification of laws in general and sales laws in 
particular are strongly embedded in legal thinking in the EU. No doubt the unified EU 
sales law will reflect its parentage namely the CISG and PECL and hence as far as 
interpretation of contracts is concerned, rely on a contextual approach. Whether the UK,  
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or any other EU domestic system for that matter, can ‘hold out’, remains to be seen; but 
the advantage for any legal practitioner to become familiar with unified laws such as the 
CISG is clear.  
5 Conclusion 
It should be obvious by now that the creation of a global law is currently impossible 
but at the same time ‘creeping’ globalisation of law is also a fact. Uniform laws, 
transplantations and modernisation of laws taking into account the successful uniform 
laws such as the recent amendments to the German BGB will eventually reduce the 
availability and hence importance of domestic laws as the most important factor in 
choosing a governing law. In other words, the differences between individual domestic 
bodies of laws have only been narrowed because at the same time differences still exist.  
The argument of this paper hinges on the recognition of legal practitioners to realise 
that uniform laws are a viable alternative which will reduce the uncertainty in case a 
foreign law needs to govern the issues at hand. There are increasing numbers of domestic 
systems in the world which do have uniform laws embedded in their system which either 
run parallel with their own ‘home-grown’ domestic law or have replaced it entirely.  
It is therefore astonishing to see legal practitioners exclude from their contracts the 
uniform aspect such as the CISG. The problem is that familiarity with their own legal 
system has not been achieved and hence when confronted with the issues of having to 
deal with the CISG the necessary technical and factual knowledge has not been learned. 
The result simply is that clients are not given the best advice. It is an inevitable fact – and 
the developments in the EU confirm this – that the march towards uniform global laws is 
inevitable. It is only a matter of time when this will happen and surely training in the new 
way of giving legal advice is also good advice.  
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